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ABSTRACT
The European social dialogue provides for the signing of collective
agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions organised at
the European level. Effectiveness to a great extent depends on the shadow
of hierarchy, which is cast by the threat of legislative action and by ensuring
implementation of collective agreements through public intervention. The
need for the shadow is illustrated by the initial priority given to statutory
agreements and the problems of implementation of more recent non-
statutory agreements. While the shadow of hierarchy is important to ensure
the effectiveness of social dialogue, social dialogue procedures are not
characterised by strong principal-agent relationships. In particular, non-
statutory agreements stem from a bottom-up private sector-inspired tra-
dition of industrial relations. Even in the case of statutory agreements, the
European Commission, as principal, does not appoint the agent and the
delegation is implicit rather than explicit. Moreover, successful delegation
entirely depends on whether the agents reach agreement between them-
selves. While the Commission could revoke delegation if Community
objectives are not realised and by setting statutory criteria for implementing
an agreement, its room for manoeuvre is limited for reasons of political
pragmatism.
. Introduction
The European social dialogue provides for the signing of collective
agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions organised
at the European level. Such agreements constitute a form of governance
clearly limited to the sectoral area of the employment relationship and
occurring outside the main political legislative avenue of decisionmaking.
Collective agreements have become part of the institutional reality since
the introduction of the ‘ European social dialogue’ provisions in the
Social Agreement attached to the Maastricht Treaty – subsequently
introduced in Articles – EC Treaty. These provisions allow for four
procedural types of European collective agreements (CAs).
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COCOCAs are Commission-initiated and Council-implemented CAs.
According to the EC Treaty, the Commission has to consult the
European social partners on all legislative initiatives in the social policy
field. During consultation, the European social partners may express
their desire to deal with the issue by European collective agreement
rather than by legislation. In this case the Commission will suspend its
legislative action; if the social partners reach an agreement this solution
will be preferred to legislative action. In order to implement this type
of European collective agreement, the European social partners can
request that the European Commission and the Council adopt their
agreement by a Council directive, in which case the agreement will have
the same effect as European legislation and will be binding for all
member states, which can be penalised in court for non-implementation.
This solution is inspired by national industrial relations systems which
provide strong public intervention to give effect erga omnes to collective
agreements.
COSICAs are Commission-initiated but self-implemented CAs. As in
the first case, the European social partners sign a collective agreement
following consultation by the Commission on a proposal for social
legislation. However, instead of asking the Commission and the Council
to implement the agreement with a directive, the European social
partners decide to implement the agreement themselves by relying on
their national member organisations and the legal instruments and
institutional infrastructure of industrial relations available in the member
states. In this case, the agreement does not become part of Community
law, and the possibility to punish non-implementation through court
action appears very limited (Treu : ; Schiek ).
SISICAs are self-initiated and self-implemented CAs. European col-
lective agreements do not need to originate in an initial consultation by
the Commission on a legislative proposal. The European social partners
are entirely free to take the initiative to enter into negotiations and sign
an agreement on the matters they consider appropriate. They can
subsequently implement such a European collective agreement with the
instruments of industrial relations available to their member organisa-
tions at the national level.
SICOCAs are self-initiated but Council-implemented CAs. As in the
preceding case, the European social partners take the initiative them-
selves to negotiate on an issue. However, rather than implementing
the signed agreement autonomously, namely with the instruments of
industrial relations available to their national member organisations,
the European social partners can request the implementation of the
European agreement by Council directive, provided that the content of
the agreement falls within the competence of the Community.
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The relationship between ‘ sectoral governance’ and ‘ territorially
bound democratic government’ in the European social dialogue is thus
characterised by two dimensions. Firstly, public authority, and in
particular the European Commission, can provide the incentive for the
European social partners to negotiate. Secondly, European institutions,
and in particular the Commission and the Council, can intervene to
ensure the implementation of a collective agreement by making it
legally binding. We can distinguish between such statutory agreements
(COCOCAs and SICOCAs) and non-statutory agreements (COSICAs
and SISICAs).
The ‘ shadow of hierarchy’ over the European social dialogue is
illustrated in Table . Using the grid of four procedural types of
agreements and analysing the number and types of European collective
agreements signed over the past fifteen years, this article makes three
claims:
+ Firstly, to be effective the European social dialogue is to a great extent
dependent on the shadow of hierarchy, which is cast both by
incentives to negotiate and by ensuring implementation through
public intervention.
+ Secondly, while the shadow of hierarchy plays an important role in the
European social dialogue, the procedures on adopting collective
agreements are often difficult to define in traditional principal-agent
terms. The theory assumes clear delegation and the principal’s control
over the agent. The social dialogue appears at first sight to be a form
of governance in which public authority has delegated policymaking
functions to private actors within the particular sector of employment
regulation. However, the reasons for delegation, the nature of
delegation and the possibilities for control are often different from
what principal-agent theory would suggest.
+ Thirdly, this article also addresses the question – suggested as well by
principal-agent theory – of whether sectoral governance (in the shadow
T 
Implementation by Council
directive
(statutory agreements)
Autonomous implementation
(non-statutory agreements)
Commission-initiated COCOCA (Commission-
initiated and Council-
implemented CA)
COSICA (Commission-initiated but
self-implemented CA)
Self initiated SICOCA (self-initiated but Council-
implemented CA)
SISICA (self-initiated and self-
implemented CA)
Strongest shadow of hierarchy (in bold); weaker shadow (in italic), weakest shadow (in roman).
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of hierarchy) provides more effectiveness than hierarchical democratic
government. The European social dialogue provides only very modest
evidence of ‘ rolling back government’ to ensure effectiveness.
In the first part of this article, I will show how all the earliest European
collective agreements took the form of statutory agreements, and more
specifically COCOCAs. Thus, the social dialogue was initially used only
as a regulatory technique initiated by the Commission and implemented
by Council directive, and the social partners did not pursue autonomous
action. This illustrates the dependence of the social dialogue on the
shadow of hierarchy. Yet, despite the shadow of hierarchy, COCOCAs
are odd in principal-agent terms, characterised by unclear delegation of
the regulatory task. Evidence of the effectiveness of social dialogue – an
alternative to normal legislative intervention and ‘ rolling back
government’ – as a regulatory technique is mixed.
In the second part I will analyse the recent emergence of more
autonomous collective agreements, namely non-statutory agreements.
While the emergence of these agreements seems to contradict the
argument that the European social dialogue works only in the shadow of
hierarchy, a closer look reveals that even such autonomous agreements
often emerge only with public incentives and that the effectiveness of
their implementation proves to be highly problematic. The argument ‘ no
effective agreements without shadow of hierarchy’ thus remains, to a
great extent, valid. Non-statutory agreements are hard to define in
principal-agent terms when they are adopted on the initiative of the
social partners (SISICAs), in which case there is no delegation by
the ‘ government’. Yet, for non-statutory agreements initiated by
Commission consultation (COSICAs), the Commission has stressed its
intention to retain control as the principal over regulatory processes.
However, the analysis of the non-statutory agreements also shows that
the European social dialogue is not only about providing a regulatory
technique alternative to traditional legislation (and thus about ‘ rolling
back government’) but it is also about more bottom-up instruments
occupying a governance space where hierarchical legislation would never
intervene.
. Statutory agreements (COCOCAs and SICOCAs)
.. The shadow of hierarchy to ensure the eﬀectiveness of the social
dialogue
Following the introduction of the European social dialogue procedure in
the Maastricht Treaty, all early European collective agreements took the
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form of COCOCAs. Agreements were signed only after an initial
consultation by the European Commission and not on the initiative of the
social partners. This was due to the imbalance in power position between
management and labour at the European level. European employers’
organisations have no particular interest in European regulation on social
issues. Labour, for its part, lacks the bargaining power to get manage-
ment to the negotiating table on issues it considers important. This is
partially explained by the facts that ‘ labour at the European level’ is not
homogeneous and that trade unions from different member states may
consider their interests to be divergent. Even if national trade union
leaders may still develop a common ‘ European labour interest’ within the
framework of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), it is
less evident that the rank and file will develop a sense of European labour
solidarity (Turner : ). Due both to divergent interests and to the
large numbers of people and countries involved, the basic instruments of
class struggle, such as a strike, are particularly difficult to develop at the
European level.
Therefore, besides (very) soft norms which are not considered prob-
lematic by management, the European social dialogue is likely to lead to
results only under the threat of legislative action. Only if management
faces the risk of binding and more demanding provisions will it have an
incentive to negotiate with labour. Bercusson described the process as
‘ bargaining in the shadow of the law’ (Bercusson : ; : ).
Moreover, the ‘ shadow of hierarchy’ has proved equally important at
the implementation stage of European collective agreements. Although
the social dialogue provisions introduced at Maastricht provided that
European collective agreements could be implemented with the means of
industrial relations available at the national level, the European social
partners had strong doubts about the effectiveness of this implementation
route given the diversity of industrial relations in the member states and
the lack of instruments available for the European social partners to
ensure compliance by their member organisations (see below). Conse-
quently, for (nearly) all agreements signed before , the European
social partners requested implementation by Council directive. In total,
three European cross-sectoral agreements were signed and implemented
by Council directive, namely those on parental leave (), part-time
work () and fixed-term work (). In all three cases, agreement
among the social partners was reached only after initial consultation for
legislation by the Commission. Also at the sectoral level the threat of
legislation – or at least the ‘ shadow’ of an existing legislative framework –
played a decisive role in the signing of the three European sectoral
collective agreements that were implemented by Council directive. All
three agreements deal with working time in sectors that were originally
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excluded from the Working Time Directive (//EC). Agreements in
the seafarers’ sector () and the civil aviation sector () were signed
after the Commission had announced in its white paper the intention to
extend the directive to those sectors (Keller and Bansbach ). The
 agreement on working conditions of mobile workers in interoper-
able cross-border services in the railway sector was triggered by the
special treatment for this sector in the new Working Time Directive
//EC.
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, several observers con-
cluded that, given the dependence on hierarchy, in terms of both threat
of legislation and public intervention to ensure implementation the
European social dialogue was a regulatory technique rather than an
additional level of bipartite negotiation in an autonomous multilevel
collective bargaining system (Lo Faro ; Bernard ).
.. COCOCAs and principal-agent relationships
Although the (initial) practice of the European social dialogue shows that
there is a clear hierarchical relationship between the public authority and
the private actors ensuring such sectoral governance, this relationship
differs on several points from what could be called a strong principal-
agent relationship. According to principal-agent theory, governments
may delegate regulatory tasks to an agent where the latter can offer better
expertise and flexibility or can create longer-term credibility beyond the
changing preferences of governments and daily politics. As noted above,
the theory assumes that delegation is clear and that procedural guaran-
tees allow the principal to exercise ex post control on the agent. Signing
European collective agreements on the initiative of the Commission, and
subsequently giving them binding force by Council directive (in COCO-
CAs), may appear as an alternative European regulatory technique
where the public authority as principal has delegated the regulatory task
to private actors as agents. Yet, the procedure for the adoption of
COCOCAs is a very particular one in principal-agent terms.
Above all, agents are not ‘ independent authorities’, but the main
stakeholders in the field. The argument for delegation may be based on
the fact that the social partners have expertise and can ensure flexibility
by adapting to sectoral and local conditions, and may thus be more
effective policy deliverers than government. Yet, the normative argu-
ments to leave regulation directly in the hands of the stakeholders (rather
than an independent authority) are related to a bottom-up approach to
socioeconomic governance and traditions of the autonomy of collective
bargaining, rather than to the idea of independence from daily politics
and from changing interests.
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Secondly, the European social dialogue procedure (even in the form of
COCOCAs) does not constitute an explicit and clear delegation to the
social partners. The Commission consults the social partners on a
legislative proposal, and at that point the latter can express their
preference to deal with the issue by collective agreement. Yet, the
principal, the Commission, does not set out a detailed regulatory task for
the agent. Moreover, the social partners are autonomous: they can
negotiate on what they want and are entirely free to deviate from the
initial Commission proposal.
Thirdly, the principal does not appoint the agent. While the Commis-
sion has made a list of fifty-seven organisations that will be consulted on
social legislative initiatives, it abides by the principle of ‘ mutual recog-
nition’ in collective bargaining; that is, the social partners choose who to
sit with at the negotiation table.
Moreover, the principal-agent relationship is further complicated by
the fact that the Commission ‘ delegates’ to more than one agent. While
there can be more than two agents – the cross-sectoral European
collective agreements, for instance, have all been signed between ETUC,
the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe
(UNICE, now Business Europe) and the European Centre of Enterprises
with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic
Interest (CEEP) – one can argue that there are normally two opposed
(groups of) agents, namely employers’ organisations on the one hand and
trade unions on the other. The agents have opposing interests and
unbalanced resources. The principal-agent relation is thus not simply one
in which the principal sets out a clear task to a single agent whose
performance of the delegated task is subsequently scrutinised. Instead of
setting out a clear task for the agent(s), the role of the principal here is
rather to induce the agents to agree, and to provide ‘ balanced support’
to compensate for their unbalanced resources. Ultimately, whether the
delegation is successful depends on whether the agents can agree among
themselves.
While delegation is implicit rather than explicit, and the delegated
regulatory task is not well defined and left to an uncertain negotiation
process among opposing interests, the principal can ensure control over
the agents at two stages. Firstly, while the Commission suspends its
proposal to leave the social partners the opportunity to seek agreement,
it can at any time invoke its power of legislative initiative if it considers
that its original objectives are not achieved by the negotiation between
management and labour. From this perspective, the principal finds itself
in a procedurally strong position and the delegation is very provisional.
The EC Treaty states that the social partners’ attempts to negotiate
should not take more than nine months (unless the Commission agrees
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to extend the period). In theory, the Commission can even revoke its
delegation before the nine months have passed, although the Commis-
sion has always left the social partners the time they asked for, as long as
they agreed further attempts were worth trying.
Secondly, before proposing the implementation of the agreement by
directive the Commission retains its role as principal by controlling the
regulatory task delegated to the social partners. In order to give legislative
value to a European collective agreement, the Commission will verify
that the following aspects have been respected:
+ the agreement should contribute to the social aims of the Community,
and should respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality of
Community action;
+ the content of the agreement should be in accordance with Commu-
nity law, and should in particular be compatible with provisions
protecting small and medium-sized enterprises;
+ the signatories should be representative and have a mandate from
their members;
+ the agreement should be ‘ legitimate’ with regard to the role of the
non-signatory social partners and their members, i.e. mainly not
upsetting their role at the national level;
+ finally, the Commission will check the appropriateness of the agree-
ment in policy terms, i.e., whether the agreement fits with existing
Community policies and needs, and will express whether it can
endorse the aims of the agreement.
At first sight, these checks appear to provide the principal strong control
over the agent, and some have criticised them as intruding too much on
the autonomy of the social partners. However, one should not forget
that COCOCAs are by nature agreements drafted by private actors
(which can deviate considerably from the original Commission initiative)
and which are given the same force as binding legislation. Moreover,
having accepted the principle of the autonomy of collective bargaining,
the Commission has committed itself to not changing the text of the
agreement when proposing it for implementation by Council directive,
and it has even committed to withdrawing the proposal for implemen-
tation if the Council intends to make any change to it. Put differently, the
Commission has delegated the drafting of a legislative norm entirely to
the social partners and will limit itself to checking the criteria listed above
without changing the text adopted by the social partners.
In addition, in practice the Commission’s interpretation of these
criteria is lenient. Certainly, it would be difficult to imagine that the
Commission would consent to implement a cross-sectoral agreement if it
were signed only by some small European social partners’ associations.
 Stijn Smismans
Yet, there is a case before the European Court of Justice that shows the
difficulty in imposing the criteria of ‘ representativity’: that of UEAPME,
the largest European association representing small and medium enter-
prises (Smismans : –). In this case, the ECJ did not follow
UEAPME’s request to annul the Parental Leave Agreement, signed
between the three confederal European social partner organisations,
namely ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, although UEAPME had been
excluded from the negotiation process of that agreement. Moreover, on
other criteria such as subsidiarity and appropriateness the Commission’s
control has appeared even more lenient (for details, see ibid.: –,
–). In fact, the Commission and Council have never refused to
implement an agreement by Council directive. As principal, the Com-
mission finds itself in a rather weak position politically. If it refuses the
implementation of an agreement by directive the European social
partners may lose for ever any interest in using the social dialogue
procedure. For management and labour the cumbersome search for an
agreement is worth the effort only if they know their document will be
implemented without any change.
The procedure to adopt COCOCAs is thus characterised by an
unclear, nearly implicit delegation to agents who have broad room for
interpreting the delegated regulatory task but who have to come to a
common agreement. As the outcome of the process is unsure, the
principal retains the power to revoke the delegation at any time and will
check it against the criteria before providing the agreement with binding
force. While this appears formally to invest the principal with strong
control powers, in practice its political room for manoeuvre is limited,
since not implementing or changing a finalised agreement strongly risks
emptying the social dialogue procedure of any future use.
.. ‘ Rolling back government to ensure eﬀectiveness?’
As argued above, delegation of regulatory tasks to the European social
partners may be justified by their particular expertise and adaptability to
particular conditions, which would ensure more effective regulation. In
fact, the creation of the European social dialogue procedure was inspired
by the belief that such a dialogue would overcome stalemates in
decisionmaking on social issues at the European level (Falkner : ;
Mias : ; Johnson : ).
The initial outcomes of the European social dialogue after Maastricht
indeed created some optimism that such sectoral governance, ‘ rolling
back government’, would improve the effectiveness of policymaking. The
first three European collective agreements – on parental leave, part-time
work and fixed-term contracts – were able to regulate issues that had
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been blocked for years in the Council under the normal legislative
procedure. However, it is difficult to assess whether social dialogue as a
regulatory technique is more effective than the traditional legislative
procedure.
Firstly, the initial three agreements did indeed manage to provide
regulation in areas where legislation had failed, but it is not clear to what
extent this ‘ unblocking’ was due to the introduction of the social dialogue
procedure, or to the facilitating of European social policy legislation with
the extension of qualified majority voting on these issues by the
Maastricht Treaty and the UK’s temporary social policy opt-out in that
period.
Secondly, the European social dialogue outcomes have been criticised
for not providing much substantial content (Jacobs : ; Fredman
: , Keller ) although it is difficult to make such an assessment
as it raises questions about what European social policy is supposed to
deliver and how normal legislation would have dealt with it. In any case
the number of agreements with binding effect is low; of more than twenty
Article  consultations with the social partners by the Commission on
possible social legislation, only three have led to cross-sectoral agree-
ments implemented by Council directive, and thus to sectoral governance
taking priority over normal legislation.
One can conclude that as an alternative regulatory technique – that is,
instead of legislation, the Commission delegates the task of drafting the
regulation to the social partners; it is then implemented by directive – the
European social dialogue has a modest outcome. However, as the next
section will illustrate, the social dialogue is not only about delegating the
drafting of binding regulation to the social partners; it also aims to
provide a more bottom-up process of softer sectoral governance.
.. Addendum on SICOCAs
In theory, agreements that are implemented by Council directive do not
need to originate in an initial consultation by the Commission. The social
partners could themselves take the initiative to adopt an agreement and
then request its implementation by directive (SICOCAs). However, it is
very hard to find an example of this. For all existing statutory agreements
the process of negotiation has been triggered in one way or another by an
initiative of the Commission by formal consultation under Article  EC
or by informal contacts and suggestions for intervention, as was, for
instance, the case with the sectoral agreements on working time (as
explained above).
In any case, even if an agreement is autonomously initiated by the
social partners (and thus is not the result of any form of delegation), as
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soon as the social partners request the implementation of an agreement
by directive the Commission will take up its controlling role and check
the relevant criteria, as in the case of COCOCAs.
. Non-statutory agreements
.. The recent emergence of autonomous agreements: dialogue without
the shadow of hierarchy?
Bipartite action between the social partners at the European level is not
an innovation of the s. Since the s the Commission has
encouraged such dialogue by providing financial support to the social
partners and creating an institutional framework in which cross-sectoral
and sectoral joint committees can meet. This infrastructure has led to an
impressive number of bipartite documents: joint opinions, frameworks of
action, codes of conduct, guidelines, manuals and so forth. More than
fifty documents have been signed at cross-sectoral level and more than
 at sectoral level (Pochet : ). However, all these instruments have
been soft, and only after the Maastricht Treaty have we seen the
signature of European collective agreements with binding commitments
(COCOCAs), as explained above.
More recently, however, some autonomous collective agreements have
been signed in which the European social partners include commitments
that go beyond the soft tools traditionally characterising their auton-
omous dialogue. In , the European social partners expressed the will
to adopt European collective agreements with more autonomy from the
European institutions. They planned to take the initiative themselves
rather than acting after consultation by the Commission, and they would
opt for the implementation of such agreements with the instruments of
industrial relations available to them at the national level rather than
seeking implementation by Council directive.
To create more autonomy from the Commission in setting the agenda
for their negotiation, the cross-industry social partners (ETUC, UNICE
and CEEP) in November  adopted their first pluri-annual joint work
programme for the period –. Moreover, they sought solutions to
make ‘ implementation through their own means’ more effective. Until
then autonomous documents were merely joint opinions, codes of
conduct or guidelines. If agreements were to include binding commit-
ments, the social partners requested implementation by Council direc-
tive. The outcome of implementation of an agreement ‘ with their own
means’ – in which the European social partners rely on their national
member organisations and the instruments of industrial relations avail-
able to them – would be very uncertain given the diversity of national
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industrial relations systems and the absence of instruments for the
European associations to ensure compliance by their national member
organisations. Yet, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
European social partners found inspiration in the benchmarking and
reporting techniques applied in the open method of co-ordination
(OMC) by which the European Union aims to co-ordinate national
policies in the socioeconomic sphere. The social partners followed the
suggestion made by the High Level Group on Industrial Relations
(European Commission ) to introduce OMC-like methods of bench-
marking and follow-up reporting into their negotiated texts. In such ‘ new
generation texts’ the European social partners make recommendations
to their national member organisations and undertake to follow them up
by regular reporting on implementation at the national level. These
documents do not provide the same binding provisions as the implemen-
tation of European collective agreements by Council directive but, by
introducing benchmarking and regular reporting on the action under-
taken by their member organisations, the European social partners go
further than the soft commitments made in their autonomous dialogue
up to that point.
At the cross-sectoral level, five such new generation texts with their
own reporting systems have now been adopted: two ‘ Frameworks of
Action’, one on lifelong learning (March ) and another on gender
equality (March ); and three ‘ Framework Agreements’, on telework-
ing (July ), work-related stress (October ) and harassment and
violence at work (April ). At the sectoral level reporting systems
have been introduced in an agreement regarding musculo-skeletal
disorders in the agricultural sector (November ) and in a multi-sector
agreement (April ) to reduce health risks associated to the use of
crystalline silica.
.. Autonomous agreements and the need for the shadow of hierarchy to
ensure eﬀectiveness
The emergence of autonomous agreements seems to contradict the
preceding argument that the European social dialogue can function only
under the shadow of hierarchy. However, a closer look at the signed
autonomous agreements reveals that without any shadow of hierarchy
the success of collective agreements is questionable. Firstly, without any
incentive from the European institutions it appears unlikely that the
social partners will agree even on non-statutory agreements. Secondly,
the signed non-statutory agreements – lacking the binding force that
could be provided by public intervention – appear highly problematic in
their implementation.
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No non-statutory agreements without public pressure?
Although the European social partners attempted to set their own agenda
for dialogue through their pluri-annual work programmes, even non-
statutory agreements seem to emerge only when the European institu-
tions provide an obvious incentive for the social partners to negotiate,
either by explicit consultation or invitation, or more indirectly by a
cognitive framework that invites the social partners to act.
Four of the seven new generation texts emerged only after Commission
consultation or after the Commission made it clear that it intended to
take initiative in this field. This has been the case for the agreements on
teleworking, stress, musculo-skeletal disorder in agriculture and
harassment and violence at work.
The other three new generation texts did not follow an explicit
Commission initiative, but emerged nevertheless in the context of a
cognitive framework set out by the European institutions. The auto-
nomous agreement on the European licence for drivers carrying out a
cross-border interoperability service of January  should be seen in
the context of a set of regulatory initiatives relating to the creation of the
European Railway Agency for Safety and Interoperability, the Safety
Directive and the Technical Specifications for Interoperability. The
agreement clearly intends to take the lead on the legislation and states
explicitly: ‘ for the part covering the scope of this Agreement, both parties
want the directive to be written on the basis of this Agreement’. Put
differently, the threat of likely legislation made the social partners act.
With the Frameworks of Action on lifelong learning and on gender
equality, the direct threat of legislative intervention may have been less
immediate. Yet, one cannot ignore the cognitive framework on these
issues provided by the European institutions and the repeated invitation
to the social partners to take action. With a Commission that always tests
out the extent of its potential action, and a broad cognitive framework of
socioeconomic guidelines and priorities as set out in the Lisbon
Strategy – and to which the social partners claim repeatedly to be
committed – it is difficult to see collective agreements as emerging
entirely autonomously. In fact, while the work programmes presented by
the social partners in  and  had the aim of developing action
more independently from Commission’s initiatives, they were also
explicitly framed as a contribution to the Lisbon and the European
Employment Strategies. In particular they promised initiatives on lifelong
learning and on gender equality after the European Employment
Strategy had invited the social partners to take initiatives in this field
(Kerschen and Roussel-Verret ). In particular the agreement on
lifelong learning saw the light in a period – following the  Lisbon
summit – in which the EU became very active in promoting initiatives on
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education and training, by way of both directives and guidance through
an OMC procedure.
The picture that seems to emerge is one in which there is a clear
correlation between, on the one hand, the threat or likelihood of public
action and, on the other, the force and level of commitment the social
partners engage in. At one end of the spectrum, really binding commit-
ments emerge only under the clear threat of legislative action, leading to
agreements implemented by Council directive. At the other end, the
social partners engage entirely autonomously in a high number of soft
documents and statements without any particular follow-up. In between
one finds a grey zone in which the EU is more or less likely to intervene
and in which the social partners commit to call their member organisa-
tions to action with more or less constraining procedures of follow-up.
The problematic eﬀectiveness of non-statutory agreements in terms of
implementation
There remain serious doubts about the efficiency of implementation of
non-statutory agreements. There are two main problems with such
implementation. Firstly, the practices and procedures available to the
social partners are very different from country to country, regarding both
the legal effects of collective agreements and their coverage due to levels
of unionisation. This may create very diversified situations with national
collective agreements having binding effect erga omnes in certain countries
and other national agreements being mere gentlemen’s agreements
which will have effect only if taken over by the individual labour contract.
Such unbalanced implementation would question the ‘ Community
character’ of the agreement (Lo Faro : ).This may be acceptable
if one aims at a diversified multilevel system of collective bargaining but,
if the objective is also a regulatory initiative ensuring a certain level of
convergence in the common market, only implementation by Council
directive is likely to function as a sectoral governance alternative to
legislation.
Secondly, it is entirely up to the member organisations of the European
social partners to ensure the implementation of the agreement. In fact,
when the social dialogue procedure was created in the Social Agreement
added to the Maastricht Treaty, the member states attached a declara-
tion regarding the procedure of autonomous implementation, stating that
the member states have no obligation either to apply these agreements
directly or to work out rules for their transposition, and no obligation to
amend national legislation in force to facilitate their implementation.
The European social partners thus entirely delegate implementation to
their national member organisations, but they have no real power of
control or, even less, sanction over national organisations on their
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implementation efforts. The reporting systems of the new generation
texts now provide an institutionalised link between the national member
organisations and the European social partner confederations to ensure
follow-up. However, to what extent will reporting to and assessment
by the European social partners induce the national social partners to
act? Do they feel committed to the European agreement? Do both
management and labour feel committed at the national level (since they
will have to agree)? And how will the opposing interests between
management and labour play in the reporting system? Do they report
separately or together? Do they have the resources to do this reporting?
How do the European social partners evaluate and agree on the
reporting?
It is very early to make an assessment of these new generation texts. It
is worth noting, however, that neither the teleworking agreement nor the
stress agreement has even been translated into all EU languages.
According to a first assessment report on the teleworking agreement
provided by the ETUC (Clauwaert, Du¨vel and Scho¨man ), in eight
member states the implementation at the cross-industry level can be
considered finalised, while in eight other countries negotiations or
initiatives are under way. Yet, for the other nine member states no
particular measures can be identified or the data are not available. The
report mentions as especially problematic the lack of consensus between
management and labour within the member states on the degree of
obligation to enforce the autonomous agreement, and the absence of a
clear joint interpretation of that agreement. While we will have to await
future assessment of these recently adopted texts, the picture to date
seems rather to suggest that such ‘ private implementation’, without the
hierarchical intervention of public authority, may at best lead to very
partial implementation in some countries (and sectors).
.. Principal-agent relationships and the importance of distinguishing
between COSICAs and SISICAs
As illustrated above, it is not always easy to identify whether one is
dealing with a SISICA or a COSICA. The distinction, however, is
important. In its  communication on social dialogue, the Commis-
sion, while ‘ fully recognising the negotiating autonomy of the social
partners’, stressed that ‘ in the specific case of autonomous agreements
implemented in accordance with Article (), the Commission has
a particular role to play if the agreement was the result of an Article
 consultation, inter alia because the social partners’ decision to
negotiate an agreement temporarily suspends the legislative process at
Community level initiated by the Commission in this domain’ (European
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Commission ). Put differently, the Commission stresses its estab-
lished right to take initiative for legislation. While having put regulation
in the hands of the social partners, as a consequence of consultation,
the Commission will nevertheless examine whether or not the auton-
omous agreement succeeds in meeting the Community’s objectives. The
principal will thus control the agent on the delegated task and check
whether an autonomous agreement – in its content (ex ante) and in its
implementation (ex post) – ensures the objectives of the initial Commission
initiative. Should the Commission decide that the agreement does not
succeed in meeting the Community’s objectives, it will consider the
possibility of putting forward, if necessary, a proposal for a legislative act
(ibid.).
The social partners are not very happy with this ‘ intrusion’ by the
Commission into their autonomous dialogue. The question of whether an
autonomous agreement has been initiated by Commission initiative
(COSICA) – and is thus the object of Commission control – or entirely
by the social partners (SISICA) – thus not being an object of control –
thus tends to become a sensitive issue of interpretation. This was the case
with the discussion surrounding the Agreement on Work-Related Stress.
The agreement emphasises in its introduction that the European social
partners’ work programme for – had identified the need for joint
action in this field, thus anticipating the Commission consultation on
stress. Yet, the fact that the social partners had included the issue in their
work programme did not prevent the Commission from initiating – two
weeks after the publication of the programme – a consultation process on
this issue. This creates the shadow of hierarchy over the autonomous
dialogue by putting the social partners, and in particular management,
under pressure to take the promise to negotiate seriously, and justified the
Commission’s assessing the outcome. This has not been particularly
welcomed by the social partners, or at least by some of them, as
demonstrated an employer representative defining the Commission
initiative as ‘ a highly unconstructive and inappropriate consultation’ and
‘ a stab in the back of the social dialogue’. The initiative, it was argued,
had come from the social partners and the final agreement should thus be
considered a SISICA.
.. ‘ Rolling back government to ensure eﬀectiveness?’
As a regulatory technique alternative to legislation, non-statutory agree-
ments do not constitute a successful example of ‘ rolling back govern-
ment’ given their problematic implementation. However, under current
conditions, for those in favour of more European social policy interven-
tion non-statutory agreements may turn out to be the only available
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option. In particular, since the enlargement of the EU to twenty-seven
member states, the legislative route to social policy intervention fails
to deliver, since many of the new members see no value in further
European social regulation. As a consequence, also, statutory agreements
are no longer signed, since the threat of legislation is missing; that is,
management does not feel any pressure to enter into strictly binding
commitments with labour. For labour, the signing of non-statutory
agreements with their own reporting mechanisms may then be ‘ as good
as it gets’. At the same moment, management seems to have lost its
antipathy towards non-statutory agreements, which it initially regarded
as opening the door to a real European industrial relations system it did
not particularly want to engage in. Due to enlargement, non-statutory
agreements are likely to remain soft instruments with strong flexibility in
implementation, and thus will no longer be feared by management
(Branch : ).
From a pro-social policy perspective, then, the current state of affairs
of the European social dialogue may be a ‘ U-turn back to the
pre-Maastricht status of non-binding recommendations and the period of
‘‘joint opinions’’ and the continuation of ‘ regulatory minimalism’ (Keller
: ). Another perspective may hold that social dialogue is not only
an alternative regulatory technique to provide binding commitments in
some way other than by legislation, but also a multilevel governance
process leading to more or less binding outcomes. Some of the issues
addressed in the social policy field arguably lend themselves less easily to
a legislative approach, and autonomous initiatives of the social partners
would also allow for action in areas where no Commission initiatives are
foreseen (Branch : ). Social dialogue is then less about ‘ rolling
back government’ than about ‘ complementing government’. However,
in the current situation, non-statutory agreements seem to be more about
acting in the absence of government, and it is difficult to prove the
effectiveness of such action.
. Conclusion
The history of the European social dialogue shows its strong dependence
on the shadow of hierarchy. After the Maastricht Treaty introduced the
social dialogue procedure, all initial agreements emerged only on the
initiative of the Commission, and to ensure the effectiveness of their
implementation the social partners always requested that the Council
intervene by adopting a directive. The emergence of non-statutory
agreements since  does not provide a convincing argument that
social dialogue could do without the shadow of hierarchy. Even these
non-statutory agreements have emerged only when the EU provided
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incentives. In particular, the more non-statutory agreements come
close to binding commitments, the more EU initiative appears to have
been fundamental in their emergence. Moreover, the problematic
implementation of non-statutory agreements casts doubts on the
viability of agreements that do not rely on hierarchy to ensure their
application.
While the shadow of hierarchy is important to ensure the effectiveness
of the social dialogue, the social dialogue procedures are not character-
ised by strong principal-agent relationships. Even when agreements result
from initial Commission consultation, there is no clear delegation to the
social partners. Moreover, the Commission does not appoint the agents
and successful delegation entirely depends on whether these agents reach
an agreement between themselves. While the risk of failure is high, the
Commission has the right to ‘ revoke the delegation’ at any time. The
Commission will also take up its role as principal in assessing a set of
criteria if the social partners ask for implementation of their agreement
by directive. Yet, even for statutory agreements, the Commission’s ‘ room
for manoeuvre’ to compel adherence to these criteria is limited for
reasons of political pragmatism.
For non-statutory agreements, the principal-agent relationships differ
according to whether the Commission has initiated the process or not. If
not, non-statutory agreements can hardly be defined in principal-agent
terms. They emerge as a bottom-up process akin to ideas of legal
pluralism and autonomy of industrial relations, rather than as a delega-
tion of regulatory tasks. However, if non-statutory agreements do
originate in a Commission consultation, the Commission considers this to
be a delegation of its regulatory tasks and will determine whether such
agreements conform to the Community’s regulatory objectives.
Finally, can the European social dialogue be described as a successful
example of rolling back government to ensure better policy outcomes?
The first statutory agreements were adopted in fields where legislation
had failed, but this may have been due to a combination of elements of
institutional change. Moreover, whether the regulatory content is better
than what would have been achieved with ordinary legislation is difficult
to assess.
It is obvious that the more recent non-statutory agreements, given their
problematic implementation, appear weak as an alternative to legislation.
One could argue, however, that the social dialogue is not only about
providing a regulatory mechanism alternative to legislation, but also
about offering more or less binding commitments at multiple levels
where legislation would never have been adopted. Yet, rather than
‘ complementing government’, the current social dialogue looks like
not-too-effective governance in the absence of government.
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NOTES
. I would like to thank Nieves Pe´rez-Solo´rzano Borraga´n and Edward Best for useful comments.
. At the sectoral level two agreements had already been presented as ‘ autonomous agreements’ by
the social partners: a ‘ Recommendation Framework Agreement on the Improvement of Paid
Employment in Agriculture in the member states of the European Union’ in  and an agreement
on working time in the railway sector in . Both ‘ agreements’ are soft guidelines to their national
member organisations, without any form of reporting or control that may give a minimum level of
bindingness to the commitments. For the soft nature of the agreement in agriculture, and the lack
of implementation of it, see Franssen : .
. The Commission has provided financial support to strengthen the organisational structure and
expertise of the social partners at the European level, in particular via support to the ‘ weaker party’
in the European social dialogue, namely the European Trade Union Confederation.
. It has been argued that these checks make implementation of a collective agreement by directive
much more political than such procedures at national level (Delarue : ; Jacobs : ).
. The first Commission initiatives on parental leave, for instance, date back to  (Delarue :
).
. A list is available at ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/consultations_en.htm.
. Failure to agree does not make the consultation procedure unimportant, since the social partners’
opinions expressed may still influence the legislation that may be adopted in case negotiation fails.
See Falkner : ; Cullen and Campbell : .
. The European agreement on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers assigned
to interoperable cross-border services of  would come closest to the definition of a SICOCA.
There was no formal or informal consultation or invitation by the Commission, but the agreement
was, nevertheless, a reply to a specific existing European legislative framework.
. Renewed with a new work programme adopted in March .
. The concept was introduced by the Commission (European Commission : ).
. The distinction between a Framework of Action on the one hand and an autonomous (Framework)
Agreement on the other is not easy to draw, although the Commission – in search of conceptual
clarity – suggests that it is an autonomous ‘ (Framework) Agreement’ when the document is to be
implemented and monitored by a given date according to the process provided in it, whereas
‘ recommendations’ or Frameworks of Action would entail regular reporting and follow-ups over a
longer period without a specific deadline by which results need to be achieved (European
Commission : ).
. Agreement on workers’ health protection through the good handling use of crystalline silica and
products containing it,  April .
. EIRR ; and EIROline, www.eiro.eurfound.eu.int///feature/euf.html.
. List of consultations at ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/consultations_en.htm.
. EIROnline, www.eiro.eurofond.eu.int///inbrief/eun.html.
. Press Release by Businesseurope, ETUC, CEEP and UAPME,  April .
. Interview with European employer representative, Brussels, April .
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